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I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately 20 million workers are represented by unions and are
subject to the terms of collective bargaining agreements. I With respect to
these agreements, application of the principle of exclusivity2 results in the
surrendering by these workers of their ability to deal directly with their
employers. 3 Under the principle of exclusivity, the union, selected by a
majority of a bargaining unit's members, is granted the right to be the
unit's exclusive representative. 4 This status as exclusive representative is a
fundamental basis underlying union strength. 5
1. See Marchione, A Case for Individual Rights Under Collective Agree-
ments, 27 LAB. L.J. 738, 738 (1976).
2. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZA-
TION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 374-81 (1976).
3. Collective bargaining agreements entered into by the employer and the
bargaining representative are binding on all employees within the unit. More-
over, separate agreements are invalid unless expressly provided for in the collec-
tive agreement. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944); Order of R.R.
Tel. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 347 (1944).
4. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
5. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220 (1977) ("The prin-
ciple of exclusive union representation, which underlies the National Labor Rela-
1
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Primarily because of the increased strength of unions, working condi-
tions as a whole have improved. Furthermore, workers' positions with
respect to management have improved. Still, it is not difficult to recognize
the danger to individual rights inherent in a union's status as exclusive
representative of all the employees within a bargaining unit.6 A union
represents the unit, not the individual; it often may subordinate the inter-
ests of the individual to further the interests of the group. 7 Consequently,
the individual worker's position with respect to the union itself has weak-
ened. It has become more difficult for the worker to challenge the union
from within.
8
The problem of reconciling the need for union strength and control
and the desire to minimize injury to the rights of individual employees is a
complex one.9 In the area of contract negotiation, the argument in favor
of broad union authority and control is persuasive. A union should have
full freedom to bargain for the greatest good of the greatest number. Con-
sequently, individual interests must at times be subordinated to the inter-
ests of the group. In the contract negotiation setting, the union must be
afforded a broad range of discretion to resolve conflicts of interest within
its ranks.
A union's control over the rights of the employees in the bargaining
unit is not, however, limited to contract negotiation; it extends to imple-
tions Act as well as the Railway Labor Act, is a central element in the congres-
sional structuring of industrial relations.").
6. See, e.g., Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Struc-
ture, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A
Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty
Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1096 (1974); Fowks, The Duty of
Fair Representation: Arbitrary or Perfunctory Handling of Employee Griev-
ances, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1976); Marchione, supra note 1; Note, The Duty of
Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation in Grievance Administration:
The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1199 (1976).
7. The Supreme Court has recognized that the negotiation of collective
bargaining agreements involves tradeoffs between diverse groups and interests.
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
8. See Comment, Finality and Fairness in Grievance Arbitration: Whether
Allegations of Unfair Representation Justify Termination of Arbitration, 1978
B.Y.U.L. REV. 132, 136.
9. Strong unions are viewed as necessary to maintain an effective sys-
tem of collective bargaining and industrial self-government.... Strong
individual interests, however, are also present in the relationship be-
tween unions and their members. Those interests may be affected by the
actions of the union as the exclusive bargaining agent in contract
negotiations and grievance procedures.
Comment, Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance Arbitration Is Not Final
if the Union Has Breached Its Duty of Fair Representation, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 309, 315 (1977).
1981] 143
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mentation and administration of collective bargaining agreements, in-
cluding the handling of grievances of individual employees. ' 0 Grievance
mechanisms established by the union and the employer in the collective
bargaining agreement usually allow only for the union to present a griev-
ance independently. If unsupported by his bargaining representative, an
employee generally may not pursue his grievance. An employee, there-
fore, may have no avenue to correct employer injustices other than
through the union-controlled grievance procedure. A grievance generally
will allege that the employee has been deprived of a vested right under the
collective bargaining agreement or has been treated unfairly by the em-
ployer. Because important individual rights may be at issue in the griev-
10. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965);
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964). See generally Lehmann, The
Unions Duty of Fair Representation-Steele and Its Successors, 30 FED. B.J. 280
(1971). National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargain-
ing representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
The proviso to § 9(a) granting to the individual employee the right to adjust his
grievance with the employer is not absolute. An employee is allowed to present a
grievance to his employer only if it is not inconsistent with the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Thus, the right is illusory because under most collec-
tive bargaining agreements unions have exclusive power to process and settle
grievances and to carry cases to arbitration. See Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973). Furthermore, §
9(a) has not been interpreted as placing an obligation on the employer to consider
individually pursued grievances. Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Lodge 355,
313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). The proviso "merely gives the employer a defense to
a charge of refusal to bargain with the majority union ... when it adjusts a griev-
ance with an individual employee or group of employees; it does not impose an af-
firmative duty to do so." R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 392. On the other hand, if
the collective bargaining agreement contains a grievance arbitration clause
which covers the grievance, and the union presents the grievance to the employer,
then the employer must consider it. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (specific performance granted to compel employer to
arbitrate grievances). See generally Marchione, supra note 1, at 730.
11. See Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee A ban-
doned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 59 (1972). See also note 10 supra.
3
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ance setting, 2 as opposed to the contract negotiation setting, 13 the extent
of union control over individual employee grievances should not be
allowed to go unchecked. ' 4
The courts have expressed concern for the rights of individual em-
ployees by adopting the duty of fair representation (DFR),1 5 a doctrine
which limits a union's discretion by proscribing discriminatory, bad faith,
or arbitrary conduct in the processing of employee grievances.1 6 This
12. The grievance procedure is the part of the collective bargaining
process where the individual has his or her most tangible interest. It is
here where the resulting decision is most likely to have a visibly direct,
immediate and personal influence upon an individual. For example, the
results may determine whether the person retains a job or is promoted.
Wortman, Overton & Block, Arbitration, Enforcement and Individual Rights,
25 LAB. L.J. 74, 81 (1974).
13. For an excellent article favoring a different standard for negotiation as
opposed to contract administration, see Summers, The Individual Employee's
Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977). See also Note, supra note 6.
14. See Marchione, supra note 1, at 740 ("if unions and employers are
allowed unrestricted freedom to 'bargain' over grievances, i.e., trade-off unre-
lated grievances, then the worker can no longer rely on the terms of his employ-
ment contract to protect his personal interests").
15. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) ("the duty of fair representa-
tion has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of. traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law").
16. When a DFR suit is brought against the union alone, there is authority
for the proposition that employees may sue in federal district court using 28
U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) as a jurisdictional basis. This statutory provision covers suits
arising under a law of the United States regulating commerce. See, e.g., Mum-
ford v. Glover, 503 F.2d 878, 883 (5th Cir. 1974); Retana v. Apartment, Motel,
Hotel & Elevator Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1021 n.3 (9th Cir. 1972). In
the majority of cases, however, an employee's claim against his union will be
joined with a breach of contract action against the employer for violation of the
collective bargaining agreement. Such suits are brought under the Labor
Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), which provides
in part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees . . . may be brought in any.district court of the
United States .... " This section refers only to suits by employers and labor
organizations, and contains no mention of suits by individual employees. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has expressly granted the right of individual em-
ployees to sue under § 301. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01
(1962). Thus, § 301 provides jurisdiction for fair representation suits when such
suits have been coupled with § 301 breach of contract suits against employers.
Most plaintiffs will join DFR causes of action with § 301 causes of action because
§ 301 suits require proof of defective union representation as a prerequisite to ob-
taining relief against the employer. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187
(1967).
Moreover, the breach of contract claim against the employer is generally
1981]
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Comment will explore the development and extent of that duty in the
areas of negligent, arbitrary, or perfunctory union conduct in the hand-
ling of individual employee grievances. The lower courts' efforts to find
appropriate standards that protect individual employee rights will be
analyzed. As will be seen, the outer limits of the duty are blurred. The duty
of fair representation, referred to as a "term of art"' 7 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1969, is still awaiting precise
definition.
II. SUPREME COURT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE STANDARD
The DFR is a judicial invention first enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court thirty-seven years ago in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
more valuable to the employee. For example, if the employee has been wrongfully
discharged by the employer, his main concern will be to obtain reinstatement, a
remedy which can only be recovered from the employer. Additionally, the basic
principle regarding damages in DFR suits is that the award against the union may
not include damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract; only
those damages caused by the union's wrongful conduct are recoverable from the
union. Id. at 183-86. See also De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing-
house, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970), in which the
court stated:
In a case such as ours, when there has been no suggestion that the Union
participated in the Company's improper discharge and where there was
no evidence that but for the Union's conduct the plaintiffs would have
been reinstated or reimbursed at an earlier date, we conclude that the
Union's conduct cannot be said to have increased or contributed to the
damages attributable to the Company's improper discharge. Thus, the
entire amount of lost earnings of each plaintiff... is properly charged to
the Company.
Id. at 289-90.
Although most unfair representation suits are brought in federal court, state
courts also have jurisdiction. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197
(1962). But defendants have the right to remove to federal court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) (1976). Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge Local 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
A union's violation of the duty of fair representation also may constitute an
unfair labor practice as a violation of the National Labor Relations Act § 8(1), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185
(1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), presented the question whether violations of the col-
lective bargaining agreement that were also unfair labor practices fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Supreme Court in Smith held: "The
authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a
collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and
does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301." Id. at 197.
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Railroad. ' 8 Steele arose under the Railway Labor Act and involved the
negotiation of a racially discriminatory amendment to a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the union and the railroad. The amendment
sought by the union and the employer ultimately would have excluded all
black firemen from employment with the railroad. The plaintiffs sought
an injunction to prevent the amendment's performance. The Steele Court
found that implicit in the statutory right of the labor organization to be the
sole bargaining agent of all members of the unit 9 was a counterbalancing
obligation to represent all members fairly, impartially, and without hostile
discrimination. In other words, the DFR was the quid pro quo of the right
of exclusive representation. By similar reasoning, the DFR was extended to
cover unions which were granted exclusive bargaining representative
authority under the National Labor Relations Act. 20 Although the DFR
initially was applied to the negotiation of contract terms, it is now clear
that it is properly imposed on all phases of a union's activities, 2' including
the area of contract administration encompassing the handling of griev-
ances.
Following pronouncement of the DFR, the Supreme Court struggled
to develop a standard by which the duty could be measured. 22 In 1967 the
most comprehensive assessment of the nature of the DFR was rendered in
the landmark decision of Vaca v. Sipes,23 a case involving a union's refusal
to process a grievance. In setting out the parameters of the duty, the Court
stated:
A breach of the . . . [DFR] occurs only when a union's conduct
toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith ....
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbi-
trarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion, we do not agree that the individual employee has an abso-
lute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of
the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. 24
While many of the earlier cases describing the union's duty were con-
cerned with discrimination, bad faith, or hostility, the Vaca formulation
18. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
19. The statutory rights mentioned in Steele emanated from the Railway
Labor Act of 1926, § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
20. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). See also Syersv. Oil
Workers Local 23, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892
(1956).
21. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957); Brady v. TWA, Inc., 401 F.2d
87, 94 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969). See ABA, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 743 (1971); Flynn & Higgins, supra note 6, at 1109.
22. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
23. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
24. Id. at 190-91 (emphasis added).
19811
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significantly added the term "arbitrary. '25 In one form or another, the
lower courts universally have applied the Vaca standard of "arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith" in deciding issues of a union's DFR.
Another more recent Supreme Court case, Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc. ,26 dealt with a union's duty in handling grievances. The con-
tention of the employees in Hines concerned the manner in which the
union had handled the grievances, not in refusing to process the grievances
as in Vaca, but the conduct of the union in advancing the grievances up to
and including arbitration. The dispute essentially involved the union's
lack of diligence in investigating facts and marshalling arguments in pre-
senting its case to the arbitrator. Although the Supreme Court reversed the
case on other grounds, it did not upset the determination of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the allegations made by
the employees were sufficient to present an issue of the union's breach of its
DFR.
The Supreme Court has not defined precisely how inadequate a
union's representation must be before the DFR is breached. Notwithstand-
ing the Court's holding that arbitrary or perfunctory treatment will not
fulfill a union's obligation, a few lower courts still hold that absent bad
faith, no breach occurs. 27 Although a majority of the courts presently pro-
hibit arbitrary union conduct as a violation of the DFR, 28 they are still
25. That this was not unintended is evidenced by the Court's repeated
use of and reference to the term "arbitrary" throughout the opinion. In
addition, the use of the disjunctive in "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith," implies that each of the three terms represents a distinct
obligation .... In contrast to the subjective notions of discrimination
and bad faith, the term "arbitrary" suggests an objective standard
against which a union's conduct is to be measured.
Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Unions Duty of Fair Representation:
Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L. REV. 885, 888 (1974) (footnotes
omitted).
26. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Sharp v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 434, 436
(E.D. Tenn. 1979); Cooper v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 13, 17
(S.D. Ind. 1976) ("plaintiff must show some evidence of fraud, deceit, or dis-
honest conduct as accounting for the union's failure to fully process his griev-
ance"); Papillon v. Hughes Printing Co., 413 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (M.D. Pa.
1976) ("nothing charged by Papillon amounts to the 'substantial evidence of
fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest conduct' which he must show in order to
prevail").
28. See, e.g., De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425
F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Jones v. TWA, Inc., 495
F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir.
1970); Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972); Ted-
ford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1976); Whitten v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1975); Cannon v. Consolidated
[Vol. 46
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struggling to define exactly what union action constitutes "arbitrary or
perfunctory" behavior. While the term "arbitrary" can be defined in the
abstract, in practice it has proven to be a very elastic concept. 29 Signifi-
cantly, a number of courts have begun to include what appears in sub-
stance to be "negligence" in their repertoire of union actions violating the
DFR.3 0
III. EXPLORATION OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THE DFR
In Vaca, the Supreme Court stated that an individual employee does
not have an absolute right to have his grievance prosecuted or taken to
arbitration. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that a union's exclusive
control over grievance procedures does not carry with it "unlimited discre-
tion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of contract, "1
and that a union "may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or
process it in a perfunctory fashion." 32 Attempts by lower courts to refine
these somewhat hazy Supreme Court guidelines into a workable test have
not been entirely consistent. Part of the emerging standard apparently
places upon a union an affirmative obligation to investigate the grievance
and evaluate its underlying merits based on proper considerations. More-
over, a union's decision to process or refuse to process a grievance must rest
on justifiable grounds.3 3
Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975); Minnis v. International Union,
UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975); Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes &
Checkers of I.L.&W.U., 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974).
29. See Savner, The Application and Meaning of the Duty of Fair Represen-
tation: Representing the Wrongfully Discharged Worker, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 13 (1979).
30. See, e.g., De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425
F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Connally v. Transcon
Lines, 583 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1978); Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580
F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306,
310 (6th Cir. 1975); Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D.
Mich. 1976). In IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court was presented with an opportunity to decide the "negligence" issue but re-
fused to rule on it. Instead, the Court limited itself to the narrow issue presented.
31. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 186.
32. Id. at 191.
33. This development was foreseen by one commentator in a comprehensive
analysis of the nature of the duty of fair representation, where it was noted:
At the very minimum... [unions] must be prepared to decide whether a
union's purported reason [for a decision] is so frivolous or insubstantial
that it seems to hide impermissible motives. And even without a hint of
improper motives, some circumstances may justify holding that a union's
reason was simply too insubstantial to support its action.
Clark, supra note 6, at 1139.
8




It is clear from the previously mentioned Supreme Court standards
that if the employer's consideration of a grievance is thwarted by the union
for an insupportable reason which is unrelated to the merits of the griev-
ance, then the DFR is not fulfilled. The fact that a union decides that the
grievance is meritorious does not insulate it from liability if it subsequently
fails to file the grievance on time. "If a union breaches its ... [DFR] in fail-
ing to process a grievance before determining its merit, it is certainly liable
for failing to initiate a grievance after acknowledging its merit."
3 4
In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. ,31 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that a union's negligence in failing to file a
timely notice of the employee's grievance with the employer constituted a
breach of the DFR. The court stated, "[W]hen a union makes no decision
as to the merit of an individual's grievance but merely allows it to expire by
negligently failing to take a basic and required step towards resolving it,
the union has acted arbitrarily and is liable for a breach of its . . .
[DFR]."3 The Ruzicka holding illustrates a growing trend toward apply-
ing a negligence standard in measuring the union's duty to an aggrieved
employee in timely processing his claim against the employer. For exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Foust v.
IBE W 37 upheld a jury verdict of $40,000 against a union for filing the em-
ployee's claim two days after the contractual deadline. The delay in filing
had been caused by needless correspondence between union officials, con-
duct described as "nothing more than negligence"3 8 by one Supreme Court
Justice.
34. Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Mich. 1976),
35. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 310. Judge McCree, in a concurring opinion, stated:
[W]hen a statutorily established exclusive bargaining representative fails
to file a statement that is a prerequisite for submission of an employee's
claim to arbitration, not because the union has made a good faith judg-
ment for a lawful reason that it should not file the document, but merely
because of its negligent omission, then it has breached its duty of fair
representation.
Id. at 316 (McCree, J., concurring). For discussions of the Ruzicka decision, see
Union's Duty of Fair Representation Held to be Breached by Negligent Failure to
Act on Behalf of Members, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1062 (1976); Duty of Fair
Representation-Imposing Liabilityfor Arbitrary Union Negligence, 7 MEMPHIS
ST. U.L. REV. 168 (1976); Negligent Failure to File a Grievance Breaches Union s
Duty of Fair Representation-Ruzicka v. General Motors Corporation, 10 SUF-
FOLK U.L. REV. 642 (1976).
37. 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 442 U.S.
42 (1979).
38. 442 U.S. at 53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
[Vol. 46
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In another case, Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 39 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the union
had breached its DFR by failing to notify timely an employee that her
grievance would not be taken to arbitration, thereby leading her to reject a
company settlement offer that she otherwise would have accepted. It was
the Robesky court's view that arbitrary conduct is not limited to inten-
tional conduct. While stating that simple negligence may not breach the
duty, the Ninth Circuit adopted a gross negligence standard: "Acts of
omission by union officials not intended to harm members may be so
egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee
and so unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary. '40
In the absence of any negligence or other wrongful conduct by a
union, it is clear that no breach can occur. For example, in Ethier v.
United States Postal Service, 41 liability was not imposed on the union even
though the grievance was found not to have been timely filed. The union
steward in Ethier had vigorously pursued the employee's grievance but had
made an understandable error in construing the time limits found in the
collective bargaining agreement. The Ethier court found no wrongdoing
on the part of the union and held that a reasonable interpretation of a con-
tract term, although ultimately found to be erroneous by an arbitrator,
does not constitute a breach of the DFR.
Many commentators praise Ruzicka and its progeny as correcting the
injustices suffered by employees whose meritorious grievances were denied
because of union negligence. 42 Not all courts, however, have been willing
to adopt a negligence standard. In Coe v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
& Plastic Workers,43 the plaintiff-employee had been discharged. The
union filed a grievance on his behalf which was denied by the employer.
Thereafter, the union attempted to notify the employer of an appeal to ar-
bitration. On the notice of appeal, the union designated the employee's
grievance as #881, when in fact it was #681. When the union finally filed a
proper notice, it was denied by the employer as untimely. Although
characterizing the union's conduct as "carelessness, ' 44 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to hold the union liable. The
court stated that while "the union may have occasioned the employer's
defense of untimeliness by misnumbering Coe's claim, 45 "an error in one
39. 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978).
40. Id. at 1090.
41. 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979).
42. See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 6, at 1147 ("there appears to be
no valid reason to leave employees, damaged because of union negligence in the
handling of their grievance, without redress").
43. 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978).
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number does not furnish so much as a scintilla of evidence to support Coe's
claim of arbitrary conduct by the union. ' 4 6 The decision in Coe arguably
effected a result denounced in Hines, that "[w]rongfully discharged em-




A union clearly may "sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would
only clog the grievance process. '48 A union may not, however, "ignore a
meritorious grievance." 49 Thus, a majority of courts hold that in making
its decision to pursue an employee's grievance, a union is under a duty to
make a good-faith determination of the meritoriousness of the grievance;"1
such a determination necessitates an adequate investigation of the griev-
ance and an evaluation of its merit based upon proper considerations." 1
This emerging standard was well expressed in Baldini v. Local 1095,
UA W: 52 "If . . . the union has taken a grievance seriously and made
reasonable efforts to investigate and process it . . .[and] [i]f the union has
made an honest, informed and reasoned decision not to proceed, it has not
46. Id. at 1351. It is unclear whether the Coe court would have accepted a
gross negligence standard, since the situation presented in Coe appeared to be no
more than simple negligence on the part of the union.
47. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
48. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964).
49. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
50. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 558
(1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967); Melendy v. United States Postal
Serv., 589 F.2d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1978) (union has a duty to screen grievances
and arbitrate those the union believes are meritorious); Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d
710, 715-16 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979);
Hayden v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
51. See, e.g., Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1240
(8th Cir. 1980) ("The need for a union fairly to evaluate the merits of grievances
has been recognized repeatedly."). In Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530
F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976), a breach was found
where the union agreed not to press a meritorious grievance on behalf of the
plaintiff, a worker suspended for 60 days, in exchange for the company's agree-
ment to rescind the discharge of a worker who had violated a number of company
rules and would in all likelihood have lost his grievance. A breach of the DFR was
found because the union's consideration of the plaintiff's grievance was not based
upon its merits.
52. 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Griffin v. International Union,
UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) ("A union may refuse to process a griev-
ance or handle the grievance in a particular manner for a multitude of reasons,
but it may not do so without reason. .. .") (emphasis added).
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breached its duty . . . ,,"3 Applying similar standards, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in Minnis v. International
Union, UA W54 that the union breached its DFR by its "utter failure.., to
make even a minimal attempt to investigate" the grievance. 55
De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse6 was a case in
which a union's total failure to investigate the merits of a grievance was
held to be a violation of the union's DFR. The union in De Arroyo mis-
takenly relied on unfair labor practice charges before the NLRB to vindi-
cate the grievants' rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit concluded that if the union had made an investigation, it would
have easily learned that the employees' claims were meritorious and
distinct from unfair labor practice charges. De Arroyo demonstrates a
growing trend toward measuring the union's conduct by a reasonable care
standard. Although not all cases dealing with the union's obligation in
screening grievances have gone so far as to focus on negligence as a breach
of duty, the cases have shown a marked shift in emphasis from the "bad
faith" and "discriminatory" aspects of the Vaca test to the "arbitrary" and
"perfunctory" ingredients of the formula. 57
The courts do not limit their inquiry to the mere fact that an investiga-
tion, however cursory, was made. An inadequate investigation may, just as
easily as no investigation, lead the union to withdraw a meritorious griev-
ance. In Hughes v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 683, 5s
the union chose not to arbitrate the grievant's wrongful discharge claim
against his employer. This decision was based on a thirty-minute interview
between the union attorney and the employee in which the employee was
only alloNted to admit or deny the employer's charges against him and was
given no opportunity to qualify his answers. In holding the employee's evi-
dence sufficient to withstand the union's motion for summary judgment,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
If summary judgment would be proper in the present case, all a
union would have to do to protect itself against a fair representa-
tion suit would be to go through the motions of processing an em-
ployee's grievance short of arbitration sufficient to withstand a
53. 581 F.2d at 151.
54. 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975).
55. Id. at 853.
56. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
57. For a typical case in which the union was held to have made an adequate
investigation, see Dishman v. Crain Bros., 415 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Pa. 1976). In
Dishman, the union made a good faith effort to investigate the grievance and had
held meetings with company officials; it then dropped the grievance only after
concluding that because the grievance was based on an undisputed contract term
it was groundless. The court found no breach of the union's duty of fair represen-
tation.
58. 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977).
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claim that these motions were' perfunctory. In this way, an
employee with a legitimate claim against his employer would have
no means of adjudicating his claim. 59
An inadequate investigation is not, however, established by facts indi-
cating only that the union's investigation "was not as thorough as that
desired" by the employee. 60
All courts apparently do not agree on the extent of the union's duty to
investigate a grievance. In Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport Co., 6
the plaintiff-employee had been discharged for health reasons. The union
representative declined to pursue the grievance after the employer pro-
vided him a medical report from the employee-plaintiff's physician. The
court was not persuaded by the employee's argument that there were dif-
fering medical opinions available which the union had not considered,
since "these . ..were never brought to the union's attention" 62 by the
employer or the employee. Evidently, the court in Wyatt did not believe
that it was the union's responsibility to inquire on its own into evidence
supporting the grievant's position.
Baldini, Minnis, De Arroyo, and Hughes demonstrate that, as a
general rule, no investigation, or an inadequate one, does not lead to a
reasoned decision on the meritoriousness of a grievance and constitutes
"arbitrary" or "perfunctory" treatment in breach of the union's DFR. If,
however, the union does make a reasonable investigation and reaches a
good-faith conclusion that the grievance lacks sufficient merit to justify
pursuing it, this action should not become a breach of the DFR simply
"because a judge or jury later found the grievance meritorious." 3 Thus,
the mere fact that the union's investigation led to an incorrect decision
does not justify a finding that the DFR was breached. 64
A distinction can be drawn between inadequate investigation of a
grievance or other forms of negligence, and a mistake in judgment. This
distinction was recognized in Pesola v. Inland Tool & Manufacturing,
59. Id. at 368.
60. See Hershman v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 434 F. Supp. 46, 51 (D. Nev.
1977).
61. 454 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1978).
62. Id. at 433.
63. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967).
64. See, e.g., Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329, 335 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Besedich v. Missile & Space Div. of LTV Aerospace Corp., 433 F. Supp.
954, 958 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hilliard v. Armco Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 658, 662
(W.D. Pa.) (the actual impropriety of the grievant's discharge is immaterial to
the strength of a Vaca-type action; the real issue is whether or not the union acts
in good faith when it determines that the discharge is proper within the meaning
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Inc . 61 Although the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan in Pesola stated that negligent processing of a grievance may be
a breach of the DFR, it concluded that no allegations to support even a
claim based on negligence had been presented. The court stated:
Although local officials decided against arbitration, that decision
was based on a duly considered judgment that... [the employee's]
absenteeism was too excessive to be defensible before an arbi-
trator. Even though the local's executive board reversed the initial
decision against arbitration, the fact of reversal does not establish
that the initial decision was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith. It indicates only that local officials made a mistake, or,
perhaps, simply a difference in opinion between the committee
and the executive board. Mistakes in judgment do not evidence a
breach of the union's duty to represent its members fairly. 66
Similarly, if a contract provision supports the grievance under one inter-
pretation and the union reasonably gives it another interpretation, the fact
that the union's interpretation may be mistaken does not establish a viola-
tion of the DFR. 67 In other words, a union may make a mistake in judg-
ment but not violate its DFR, as long as the mistake is reasonable.
Although the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the
union's, the courts have required unions to make their decisions concern-
ing the merits of a grievance on wholly relevant and competent considera-
tions. As stated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan in Curth v. Faraday, Inc. ,68 "[T]he meritoriousness of the
grievance is not the test of fair representation .... It suffices that the union
decides in good faith and on the basis of objective, rational criteria that the
grievance lacks merit .... ,,69 Generally, this requirement places no added
burden on the union since its decision that a grievance lacks merit is usual-
ly based on valid considerations, such as a reasonable interpretation of a
contract term. 70 A problem arises, however, when interests other than
those of the grievant are affected by a decision to pursue or not to pursue a
grievance.
In Curth, the union considered whether to take a facially meritorious
grievance to arbitration when to do so would jeopardize the union's finan-
cial stability. The union, having been advised by its international repre-
sentative that arbitration was likely to be futile, and knowing that the
treasury was low, decided against arbitration. The Curth court, in uphold-
ing the union's action, recognized that circumstances sometimes require a
difficult choice between the interests of a single member and the interests
65. 423 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
66. Id. at 35-36.
67. NLRB, Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 79-55 (1979).
68. 401 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
69. Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1978).
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of the union as a whole. Nevertheless, "such determinations must be
made, and the union does not breach its . . . [DFR] by deciding on the
basis of rational and objective criteria." 7 Thus, the collective strength of
the union and its ability to allocate group resources apparently are con-
sidered relevant criteria.7 2
The problem presented when the union refuses to process a meritori-
ous grievance because it lacks the resources or decides that the grievance is
not worth the cost has been considered by at least one commentator, who
concluded that a union cannot be expected to carry every meritorious
grievance to arbitration.7- He recognized that a grievance may be frivolous
either because it is trivial or because it lacks merit. It has been advocated,
however, that under those circumstances, the union should allow the indi-
vidual employee to pursue his grievance against the employer indepen-
dently and at his own cost. 74
In addition to institutional concerns, the interests of other individual
employees or a group of employees may be affected by a union's decision to
process a grievance. Moreover, the pursuance of one employee's grievance
may adversely impact upon another employee. The union's position can-
not be neutral in these situations. It must support the views of one indi-
vidual or group against those of another. In such situations, the general
standards apparently still apply, but with an added factor of a balancing
of the competing interests.
To satisfy its DFR, the union must investigate the merits of the conflic-
ting claims, evaluate them in the light of the applicable provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement and any other pertinent considerations,
and then decide which side to support.75 This was the approach taken in
Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co. 76 In Hussmann, when four openings
for positions as maintenance pipefitters were posted, the employer's main-
tenance foreman interviewed groups of employees who bid for the jobs.
The foreman selected four workers, including the three plaintiffs in Huss-
mann, on the basis of superior skill and ability. The collective bargaining
agreement specifically provided that in making promotions, seniority
should govern when the skill and ability of those being considered for the
promotion are substantially equal. Twenty-six unsuccessful bidders filed
71. 401 F. Supp. at 681.
72. See also Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979), in which the
court stated that the maintenance of good relations between the employer and the
employees in the collective bargaining unit is a relevant consideration in deter-
mining whether or not to process a grievance.
73. See Summers, supra note 13, at 274-75.
74. Id. at 274.
75. See, e.g., Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 958 (5th Cir.
1976).
76. 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980).
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grievances claiming that Hussmann violated the collective bargaining
agreement in making the promotions. Of the twenty-six grievances filed,
the union selected and processed four. These grievances had been filed by
employees with greater seniority than the successful bidders. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that sufficient
evidence had been presented for the jury to find that the union's conduct
in processing these grievances constituted a breach of its DFR to the plain-
tiffs."
The Hussmann court reasoned that a "union must fairly represent
both groups of employees and may take a position in favor of one group
only on the basis of an informed, reasoned judgment regarding the merits
of the claims in terms of the language of the collective bargaining agree-
ment."7 8 Applying this standard to the union's conduct, the court deter-
mined that the union had selected those grievances it would process solely
on the basis of seniority; it never inquired about the plaintiffs' experience
or other qualifications. The Hussmann court stated:
This conduct may be viewed as a perfunctory dismissal of the in-
terests and rights of plaintiffs. The union simply failed to represent
them in any way. The modified seniority clause specifically re-
quired balancing the interests of merit and seniority whenever
Hussmann deemed that the position warranted selection on the
basis of merit. Under the collective bargaining agreement, after
the company chose to select on the basis of merit, three separate
considerations were relevant in determining the right of any em-
ployee to be promoted. These were (1) his selection by the com-
pany, (2) on the basis of skill and ability, (3) superior to the skill
and ability of any senior employee who had bid for the position.
Disregard for the qualification of superior skill and ability could
manifest an arbitrary and perfunctory approach to promotion in-
terests, as could ignoring the qualification of seniority or selection
by the company. 9
The Hussmann holding does not mean that seniority is irrelevant in
weighing the merits of a grievance. In fact, it often may be the only rele-
vant factor. In Hussmann, however, the contractual provision concerning
promotions specifically listed skill and ability as well as seniority. The
employees had a contractual right to expect that decisions concerning pro-
motions would be made in conformity with this provision. Consequently,
the union should have evaluated the merits of the grievances in light of this
provision in the collective bargaining agreement and with due regard for
all interested employees. The Hussmann court held that by failing to do
so, the union had violated its DFR to the plaintiffs.
This reasoning of the Hussmann court is the converse of the inade-
77. Id. at 1240.
78. Id. at 1237.
79. Id. at 1239.
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quate investigation decisions previously discussed. In a conflict of interests
situation, if a union inadequately investigates and evaluates a grievance
and decides to pursue it, then the union's conduct may be a breach of the
DFR owed to employees with competing interests. Thus, a union may
breach its DFR by deciding not to pursue a grievance, as well as by
deciding to pursue a grievance.
C. Presenting Grievances
Another aspect of the union's DFR arises once the union has decided to
process an individual's grievance. A union may pursue a meritorious griev-
ance to arbitration, but present it inadequately because it prefers this pro-
cedure to initially screening out the grievance and later defending a DFR
suit. The result, however, is similar; the employee is denied a fair hearing
on the meritoriousness of his grievance.8 0 To guard against this possibility
courts have begun to regulate union conduct in preparing and presenting
grievances to ensure that the union's DFR is properly discharged.
Presently, there is disagreement over whether judicial review of a
union's conduct in presenting grievances should turn on the same criteria
as that applied in screening out grievances. There is authority for the
proposition that a lesser standard of review is desirable once the union has
decided to pursue a grievance on an employee's behalf; that some form of
ill will, bad faith, or spite is required before a union will be deemed to have
violated its DFR.8 ' While this line of authority rejects an arbitrary or per-
functory standard in assessing the union's presentation of the grievance, 82
a contrary view apparently places the higher responsibility of an advocate
on the union in cases it takes to arbitration. 83
80. See Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974),
where the court stated:
[I]t makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration
process by refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follows the arbitration trial
to the end, but in so doing subverts the arbitration process by failing to
fairly represent the employee. In neither case, does the employee receive
fair representation ....
81. See, e.g., Bruno v. United Steelworkers Local 3571, 456 F. Supp. 425,
428 (D. Conn. 1978). See generally Adomeit, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight:
Another Step in the Seemingly Inexorable March Toward Converting Federal
Judges (And Juries) Into Labor Arbitrators of Last Resort, 9 CONN. L. REV. 627
(1977).
82. See, e.g., Bernard v. McLean Trucking Co., 429 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.
Kan. 1977) (the court admitted that the hearing on plaintiff's grievance was "per-
functory," but refused to find the union in violation of its duty of fair representa-
tion).
83. See, e.g., NLRB v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir.
1978) ("While a union has wide discretion in deciding whether to take a grievance
to arbitration .... once the claim is taken to arbitration, the union must advo-
cate the employee's position.").
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The majority of cases involving a union's conduct in preparing and
presenting an employee's grievance have dealt with claims involving no
more than bad judgment. Because wrongful conduct, including negli-
gence, is distinguishable from an exercise of poor judgment, unions in
these situations generally have not been found to have violated their duty
of fair representation.
Holodnak v. Avco Corp.14 and Kesner v. NLRB, 5 are two exceptions
to the general rule that courts will not find a violation of the DFR when a
union attorney or representative has exercised poor judgment in present-
ing a grievance. In Holodnak, the employee-grievant wrote an article in a
political newspaper criticizing the union and the company. Thereafter, he
was discharged for violating a company rule prohibiting false or malicious
statements. The union took the discharge grievance to arbitration. During
the hearing, the union attorney conceded the validity of the employer's
rule and its validity under the first amendment, although the company's
act arguably was "state action" because its production was overwhelmingly
defense related and the federal government owned nearly all of the land,
buildings, machinery, and equipment. The union attorney also failed to
object to the arbitrator's improper questioning of the plaintiff's political
views. Based on the union lawyer's poor efforts, the court held that the
union's representation was "sadly lacking and ... arbitrary";8 6 thus, the
union had breached its DFR.
A case which questioned the judgment of a union representative,
Kesner v. NLRB, involved an employee who was terminated during a
merger of transport companies. The union pressed the grievance to arbi-
tration, but at the arbitration hearing the union representative admitted
that the plaintiff's grievance was without merit. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the union liable for a breach of its
DFR, stating: "When one's own representative who has been willing to
assume that status proclaims a lack of merit, it is indeed likely to be a coup
de grace to the claim.18 7
84. 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 514
F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
85. 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976).
86. 381 F. Supp. at 200-01.
87. 532 F.2d at 1175. It also has been alleged that a union's failure to pre-
sent adequately a grievance was due to an inadequate investigation of the case.
For an employee to receive a fair hearing, it is important that the union investi-
gate the complaint fully so that the arbitrator can consider it intelligently. For ex-
ample, in Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.
1978), the court held that the union breached its DFR when the grievance was
denied at the arbitration hearing because the union representative was not aware
of, and had not argued, the applicability of a seniority provision in the collective
bargaining agreement. Milstead is also important because it held that a union
representative's negligence in failing to discover an applicable provision in the
collective bargaining agreement constituted a violation of the DFR. The court
1981]
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As previously stated, a majority of decisions in this area have held that
the union's efforts have been sufficient to discharge its DFR. 8 It has been
noted that complete satisfaction with the degree of representation union
members receive cannot be expected. Consequently, the majority of courts
hold that the fair representation standard in this area deals not with the
question of whether the union member was satisfied with his union repre-
sentation, or whether the union's conduct was negligent, but whether the
union's conduct was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 9
A characteristic case is Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. ,90
in which a truck driver was fired because he refused to take the company's
sobriety test after he was involved in an accident. The contract stated that
an employee had to receive at least one warning prior to discharge unless
the cause was drunkenness or other specified conduct. Although the plain-
tiff had received no warning, the company argued that it had an unwritten
rule that refusal to take the sobriety test created a presumption of drunk-
enness and, therefore, no warning was required. At arbitration, the union
stated: "Certainly the duty of fair representation may be breached whenever a
union ineptly handles a grievance because it is ignorant of those contract provi-
sions having a direct bearing on the case." Id. at 235. See also Connally v. Trans-
con Lines, 583 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognized that under some circum-
stances negligent conduct in presentation of case may constitute a breach);
Marietta v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 414 F. Supp. 1029, 1038-39 (D.N.J. 1976) (sub-
missible issue regarding union's failure to gather evidence favorable to grievant
that resulted in inadequate presentation of claim).
88. See, e.g., Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Serv., Inc., 537 F.2d 1255,
1258-59 (4th Cir. 1976) (allegation of general lack of preparation and effort not
enough to make out unfair representation claim; some evidence to suggest griev-
ance was fully and vigorously presented, particularly where grievant congratu-
lated union representative on his performance); Ness v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 598
F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (union's conduct in allowing hearing
to continue with one less union representative than required by the collective
bargaining agreement but with equality of votes between the union and manage-
ment did not violate the duty of fair representation); Franklin v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure of the union to present
certain medical records relating to the employee at the hearing did not breach
duty); Siskey v. General Teamsters Local 261, 419 F. Supp. 48, 52-53 (W.D. Pa.
1976) (failure to inform grievant that his grievance would be presented and fail-
ure to discover and introduce a medical report did not violate the~union's duty).
89. See, e.g., Fleming v. Chrysler Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (E.D.
Mich. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 575 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1978). For cases holding
that a union's negligence in presenting a grievance does not violate the duty of fair
representation, see Jensen v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Liotta v. National Forge Co., 473 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Ferd-
nance v. Automobile Transp., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Mich. 1978);
Hilliard v. Armco Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 532
F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1976).
90. 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975).
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argued that it was unlikely that the plaintiff had been drinking at 11:00
a.m. when the accident occurred and that the plaintiff had a safe driving
record of eighteen years; nevertheless, the discharge was upheld. The
plaintiff challenged the union's presentation of the case claiming that it
failed to argue that the rule concerning the sobriety test was improper
because it was unwritten. The court held in favor of the union. It charac-
terized the union's failure to raise the issue as, at most, negligence or poor
judgment and ruled that no breach occurred. Thus, the Cannon court
viewed the employee's dissatisfaction with the union's representation as
irrelevant and refused to measure the union's conduct by a negligence
standard.
The courts also have been reluctant to assess the tactics and trial tech-
niques of the union. In Mangiaguerra v. D & L Transport, Inc. ,9 the
plaintiff, a truck driver, was fired for refusing an additional assignment
upon completion of a driving run. Drivers were permitted to refuse such
runs if they gave adequate advance notice. The factual issue presented to
the arbitrator was whether the plaintiff gave this notice. The arbitrator
held that the driver had not given such notice and sustained the discharge.
Mangiaguerra then sued his union for failure to represent him properly.
His allegations stated that the union representative did not hold a prior
conference with him, was virtually silent at the hearing, failed to point out
that the plaintiff informed his employer that he was fatigued, and failed to
object to certain hearsay evidence. The court found the union representa-
tion adequate. It was not enough, said the court, that the union represen-
tative was guilty of poor judgment, laxity, or negligence.
It appears that most courts apply different standards to cases where
the union has made some effort to present an employee's grievance, and
cases in which the union has totally refused or inadequately processed an
employee's grievance. Seemingly, more egregious behavior is required to
establish a breach of the union's DFR in cases involving inadequate pre-
sentation of an employee's grievance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DFR was designed as a "bulwark to prevent arbitrary union con-
duct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the pro-
visions of federal labor law." 92 Whether this statutorily implied duty, as
applied to unions today, is sufficiently serving its intended purpose is ques-
tionable. This is most likely a result of the confusing array of standards and
word-tests employed by the courts in measuring the duty. As the cases
reveal, the present status of the nature of the DFR is anything but clear.
Fortunately, recent decisions reflect a trend away from requiring proof
91. 410 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
92. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
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of bad faith, deceit, or improper motive for establishing a violation of the
DFR. Acceptance of "arbitrary" and "perfunctory" as appropriate stan-
dards is rapidly becoming universal. In defining and applying these terms
to actual union treatment of grievances, however, the courts have yet to
develop a satisfactory approach that assures the important protection of
workers' individual rights. The decisions lack a cohesive framework from
which courts may proceed in their analyses of fair representation suits. The
application of the well-developed reasonable care standard to union con-
duct in treating grievances would provide such a framework.9 3
Although the frequency of unfairness in grievance handling is impossi-
ble to measure, there is no doubt that the danger to the individual is sub-
stantial. The financial and emotional security of the American worker and
his family depend largely upon his job rights.9 4 Protection and enforce-
ment of these rights take place through the union-controlled grievance
machinery. A union's negligence in pursuing, preparing, or presenting
grievances should not operate to deprive the individual worker of these all-
important rights. Moreover, the well-established concept of negligence as
a standard by which union behavior will be evaluated would provide a
framework more workable than the less well-developed concepts now em-
ployed: "perfunctory," "fairly," or "in good faith." Furthermore, the
judiciary is comfortable and well-versed in the application of the negli-
gence standard and inconsistencies among courts in their assessments of
union conduct would likely decrease.
Finally, the expansion of the parameters of the DFR would not place
an intolerable burden on unions. The test for common law negligence,
reasonable care under the circumstances, would allow the courts to con-
sider the balancing of interests involved in fair representation cases and the
different contexts of the union's duties.9 5 Concern for the protection of
workers' individual rights is an important but overlooked aspect of federal
labor policy. 96 A need for reform in the area of union handling of griev-
93. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
94. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 57.
95. See Comment, supra note 9, at 326-27. See also Note, Individual Ac-
tions for Breach of a Collective Bargaining Agreement:Judicial Alternative to the
Grievance Procedure, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 765. For a contrary view, see Com-
ment, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation: Group Membership Interests v.
Individual Interests, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 779 (1978).
96. Labor Management Relations Act § l(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976),
provides:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the
full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both em-
ployees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide
orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by
either with the legitimate rights of the other, [and] to protect the rights
of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations ....
(Emphasis added.)
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ances is apparent. "[U]nless the courts change their judicially created stan-
dard and allow a recovery for ordinary negligence, employees will always
be second class citizens in their industrial world.19 7
MAUREEN A. McGHEE
97. Flynn & Higgins, supra note 6, at 1144.
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